

Comprehensive Review of the Guard and Reserve

During a decade of sustained engagement in combat operations, the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces have been transformed, both practically and philosophically, from a strategic force of last resort to an operational reserve that provides full-spectrum capability to the Nation.

The Comprehensive Review was directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review to determine the best ways for the Reserve Components to be "...vibrant... seamlessly integrated...trained, mobilized and equipped for predictable routine deployment... well into the future."

The review took place over more than six months in 2010-11. Participants included representatives from all OSD Undersecretaries, all Military Departments and Services, the Joint Staff and all Combatant Commanders.

Key Recommendations:

Accessibility

The Comprehensive Review addresses the need for assured access to the Guard and Reserve forces for the full spectrum of military missions. Proposed legislative changes would preserve Presidential authority while giving Combatant Commanders access to the Reserve Components for missions short of war.

Utilization

The Comprehensive Review highlights the Reserve Components as ideal for predictable and consistent missions. Further, it recommends that Services consider the RC as a force of first choice for missions for which they are well suited due to their value and cost-effectiveness. RC components provide unique skills and capabilities acquired from their civilian lives that complement many current and anticipated Department of Defense requirements. As such, for many missions the RC should be considered an effective and viable option.

Continuum of Service

The Comprehensive Review supports an expanded continuum of service, allowing RC members to transition easily between various levels of participation. This allows not only for seamless transition between active and reserve statuses, but also for service members to satisfy personal, professional, and family commitments while remaining engaged in military service. The Review also proposes an enhanced type of differentiated service, allowing some individual members to choose to serve in units that require a greater time commitment and accessibility and encouraging the services to develop such units.

Consolidated Training and Skills

The Comprehensive Review underscores the importance of maintaining the readiness gains that have been made, while reducing redundancy. By utilizing the recommended joint regional state-of-the-art training facilities, simulators and shared pools of equipment, services will match training requirements to a network of local facilities and resources to most efficiently utilize investments.

Summary: This realignment of the Total Force and the integration of the Reserve Components will allow for the United States to capitalize on the investments that have been made into the RC over the last decade, increase and expand the capacity of the Total Force, and keep faith with service members, families, communities, and employers.



Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

Volume I Executive Summary & Main Report

Prepared by

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Foreword

This report represents the judgment of civilian policy makers and military leaders, with extensive input from both the Services who generate and provide forces, as well as the Combatant Commands who employ them. It provides the Secretary of Defense with reliable inputs to support fundamental decisions regarding future use of the National Guard and Reserve.

The assumptions influencing this report are: (1) that the United States will continue to require military forces capable of operating across a broad spectrum to prevail over contemporary challenges, to deter potential adversaries, and to respond to unforeseen contingencies; (2) that we must do our utmost to preserve the All-Volunteer Force; and (3) that our strategic legitimacy is dependent on remaining connected to the public we serve.

During a decade of sustained engagement in combat operations, the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces have been transformed, both practically and philosophically, from a strategic force of last resort to an operational reserve that provides full-spectrum capability to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions, have produced an operationally savvy and resilient force that fully expects to be employed on a periodic basis. This new force represents a ten-year investment in resourcing commitments and the personal sacrifice of service members and their families. That investment can reliably provide the Department of Defense with essential operational capabilities and strategic agility. Good stewardship demands that we continue to capitalize on this investment.

This report provides background and recommendations to inform decisions regarding the future role of the Reserve Component that are consistent with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. It is a collaborative effort of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and the Military Services that examines the roles for which the Reserve Components are best suited, and the best ways to optimize their capabilities and strengths. This report identifies the environment needed to provide a trained, equipped, ready and available Reserve Component; presents options for future force rebalancing considerations; and identifies necessary revisions to law, policy and doctrine. The findings validate some common themes from past studies while providing instructive insights for charting a course for the future.

Although the body of this report does not address the absolute cost of each Service's Reserve Component, it makes clear the value of those organizations. Unless we had chosen to dramatically increase the size of the Active Components, our domestic security and global operations since September 11, 2001 could not have been executed


without the activation of hundreds of thousands of trained Reserve Component personnel.

The fundamental conclusion of the report is that the Quadrennial Defense Review was correct in its assessment that the National Guard and Reserve, if employed judiciously and with strategic acumen, can effectively contribute to the National Security Strategy even beyond contemporary expectations. It makes clear that decisions regarding the future role of the Reserve Components and the balance between active and reserve forces must be seen through the lens of the All-Volunteer Force. Doing so will require a Reserve Component that is both capable and sustainable.


The 21st Century will require the United States to maintain an array of forces that can consistently win across the full spectrum of military operations on a global scale. These forces must be augmented by an accessible and ready pool of reinforcing and complementary capabilities, some of which will reside in our Reserve Components. In order to accomplish these two objectives with an All-Volunteer Force, we must continue to train, man, equip and deploy Reserve Component capabilities, with appropriate frequency and duration, across all mission sets.

The policies and practices necessary to use the National Guard and Reserve as the report suggests have not yet been fully institutionalized. This work provides a foundation upon which to build a cohesive Department of Defense execution strategy that preserves current Reserve Component competencies, efficiently integrates their capabilities, and leverages Reserve Component value.

We thank the men and women who contributed to this work.



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Executive Summary

Consistent with the FY 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to lead a Study with the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Combatant Commands, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel, the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the Director, Net Assessment to determine the best ways that the QDR's stated objectives for the Reserve and National Guard to be "... vibrant ... seamlessly integrated ... trained, mobilized and equipped for predictable routine deployment ... well into the future" could be incorporated into the National Military Strategy. This report is the result of that Study, providing findings and recommendations regarding the six objectives defined in the implementing guidance:

1. **Costs.** Establishing a common Departmental baseline costing methodology for the Total Force and identifying the instances where such common baseline costing is not feasible.
2. **Uses.** Leveraging Departmental plans for the future to best determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of the Guard and Reserve to best advantage during drill time, periods of Active Duty, and during mobilization.
3. **Roles.** Determining those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited and where Guard and Reserve forces should be considered as a force of first choice.
4. **Standards.** Determining the conditions and standards that provide for a trained, equipped, ready, and available Guard and Reserve in order to meet the demands of the Total Force while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers.¹
5. **Rebalancing.** Proposing recommendations on rebalancing the mix of Active and Reserve Components to meet demands of the Combatant Commands based on the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals.
6. **Changes.** Proposing needed law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet the demands and conditions determined in Objectives 2-5 above.

Although this report recommends numerous changes, it also recognizes that the Services have made tremendous strides in the deployment and use of their Reserve

¹ In recognition of this broader relationship, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) in the FY 2012-2016 Strategic Plan dated December 2010 has defined the "Total Force Community" that includes the Active Component, the Reserve Component, the Department's civilian employees, and contractors together with the families and employers of its service members.

Components, especially since 2001. This report looks to build on these past successes to further mature and develop the substantial advances that have already been made.

Future Role of the Reserve Component

For the foreseeable future the Reserve Component must continue to:

- Contribute to America's successful resolution of current overseas conflicts
- Provide military capabilities to ensure defense of the homeland against external attack, and to support civil authorities in response to attacks or to natural disasters
- Remain prepared to augment and reinforce the national effort with combat and support forces in case of major combat operations
- Use capabilities efficiently to support Combatant Commanders around the world
- Provide vital capabilities to meet national defense objectives
- Support the Services' efforts to preserve the All-Volunteer Force.

Accordingly, the Department must continue to ensure availability of a capable and operationally ready Reserve Component. As contingency funding decreases, affordability is a concern and will require additional work. In a resource constrained future environment, additional resources as well as adjustments to the Reserve Component may be necessary to enhance operational readiness. The United States cannot continue to remain engaged globally given DoD's current force structure without employing the Guard and Reserve. To do otherwise, risks wearing out the Active Component. Keeping the Reserve Component prepared through periodic, predictable deployments is prudent and adds value to the Total Force by maintaining Guard and Reserve readiness, relieving stress on the Active Component, and providing force structure options in a resource constrained future. To ensure proper implementation of this approach, the Department will need to (1) program use of the Reserve Component in its base budgets and (2) articulate its requirement to the Nation's elected leadership and to the American people.

Importance of the Reserve Component

The Reserve Component is an irreplaceable and cost-effective element of overall DoD capability. The Guard and Reserve provide operational forces that can be used on a regular basis, while ensuring strategic depth in the event of mid to large-scale contingencies or other unanticipated national crises when they are not being employed. Accordingly, it is important that DoD recognize the Reserve Component as providing:

- Operational forces that
 - Provide vital capabilities for meeting national defense objectives

- Provide combat and support forces to large-scale conventional campaigns
- Augment and reinforce the Active Component appropriately
- Balance the stress across the Total Force
- Preserve the readiness gains made in the Reserve Component over the last decade
- Spread the burden of defending American interests across a larger portion of the citizenry
- Preserve the All-Volunteer Force
- Essential strategic depth.

Reliance on the Guard and Reserve as a source of operational capability requires that the Department commit to managing its forces as a Total Force, rather than separate Active, Reserve, and civilian components. To further support this goal, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to identify imbalances in the capabilities and capacities of the Total Force. The Services should strive to use the Active, Reserve and civilian components, along with contractors, creatively to remediate those imbalances and meet the demands of the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders.

When rebalancing the force to meet future national security challenges, the Guard and Reserve should be a “force of first choice” for those tasks for which they are particularly well suited, owing to their overall cost effectiveness and the skill sets that they can provide. Missions that follow a predictable, operational schedule fall clearly into this category.

While not in the operational chain-of-command or seeking greater management of the Services’ responsibility to organize, train and equip their Reserves and fill requests for forces from the Combatant Commanders, the ASD(RA) must continue to act as a full contributor to the National Defense Strategy. By law and regulation, the ASD(RA) has “as his principal duty the overall supervision of reserve component affairs of the Department of Defense [Title 10, U.S. Code, §138(b)(2)] and “is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) and the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for reserve component matters in the Department of Defense” [Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), §344.4]. In this context, to better fulfill those duties and enhance the Services’ ability to manage their respective Total Force as envisioned in law, access to appropriate DoD forums and activities such as the 3-Star Programmers Group, the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG), and the Defense Material Readiness Board (DMRB) is critical.

The Global Force Management Board should (1) synchronize the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) with Service programmatic planning and (2) provide an annual update to the Secretary of Defense describing the Reserve Component sourcing identified in the GFMAP to facilitate budgeting for the planned use of the Reserve Component.

Establishing a Common DoD Costing Methodology for the Total Force

In estimating costs for its components, each of the Services uses cost methodologies that are adapted to their respective business model. While the Services use some common cost-estimating methodologies, e.g., personnel composite rates and the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST), the means of accommodating differences in missions, operating profiles, and accounting systems vary considerably. Although these models have been refined over the last decade, they focus primarily on near-term personnel and operating costs. Less consideration has been given to the identification and allocation of overhead costs and to the analysis of life-cycle costs.

While the factors cited above will complicate the adoption of a common detailed operating-cost model across the Department, OSD and the Services can significantly improve their Total Force costing capabilities by making the following adjustments to their current costing methodologies:

- Refine existing methodologies to assess a long-term view beyond the current FYDP, and better compare full-time and part-time personnel, operating, and life-cycle costs, both on an individual basis and on a unit basis
- Update existing methodologies as operating parameters and emerging assumptions evolve
- In conjunction with the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), develop methodologies to assist in comparison of costs of similar capabilities across different Services
- Develop methodologies to identify and allocate overhead costs equitably for both full-time and part-time forces and to estimate costs for supporting remote and distributed reachback centers such as the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers.

Using the Guard and Reserve to Best Advantage

Using the Guard and Reserve to best advantage increases the overall capability and capacity of the United States to defend its interests. In the absence of major conflict, the Reserve Component is best employed for missions and tasks that are predictable,

relatively consistent over time, and whose success can be substantially enabled by long-term personal and geographic relationships.

Accordingly, Service force-generation processes should consider predictability, consistency, continuity, and the desirability of establishing enduring relationships or exploiting regional expertise when determining whether Guard or Reserve units are appropriate to support particular GFMAP requirements. Similarly, Service force-generation processes should provide predictability to Guard and Reserve units that may be accessed to perform Homeland Defense (HD) or Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions. There are already National Guard and Reserve units in a high state of alert in support of specific NORAD and USNORTHCOM plans. Execute Orders (EXORDs) and Combatant Command plans are valuable resources for identifying necessary forces.

In addition, the Department should review statutes and DoD policies that restrict consideration of civilian skills when determining employment and compensation of either Active or Reserve Component service members with the eventual aim of removing such restrictions, to include consideration of whether disclosure of civilian skills should be voluntary or mandatory. Removing such restrictions would enable DoD to take full advantage of the skills and expertise available within both the Active and Reserve Components and could offer particular advantages for meeting the non-kinetic demands characteristic of the emerging national security environment. At the same time, it is important that any changes be consistent with All-Volunteer Force policy and ensure that unit readiness is not affected adversely.

Roles for Which the Guard and Reserve Are Well Suited

The Reserve Component is well suited for use as a source of strategic depth as well as in a wide variety of operational roles, including: (1) rotating operational units deployed in response to Combatant Commander (CCDR) needs and Service requirements; (2) units and teams deployed in support of CCDR Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity activities around the globe; (3) individual augmentees who can be deployed in response to CCDR, Defense agency, or Service needs; (4) units, teams, and individuals to support core Unified Command Plan (UCP) missions such as HD and DSCA as well as to support Governors in state security; and (5) units, teams, and individuals assigned to support DoD or Service institutional needs.

To the extent possible, the Department's Global Force Management Process (GFMP) should consider Reserve Component forces for missions and tasks in support of the Department's Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity activities and specialty missions requiring unique skills, particularly when the Reserve Component units have an enduring relationship with a supported command. The Reserve

Component can provide a stable, ready trained capability for meeting Combatant Command needs and Service requirements. In addition, the Reserve Component should be a resource to the nation for both HD and DSCA. The National Guard, given their community base, knowledge of, and familiarity with, state and local governments, and civilian skills, should continue to play the principal role.

Options for Rebalancing the Total Force

Although each of the Services is making commendable efforts to manage their Active and Reserve Components as a Total Force, additional possibilities exist for rebalancing those forces. In particular, the Services should consider implementing some or all of the following options for rebalancing capabilities and capacities within their Total Forces:

- Relying on the Reserve Component as a source when building force structure to alleviate shortfalls or preserve or expand capacity especially in cases where the Reserves are particularly well suited and cost is a consideration
- Assigning some recurring operational missions to Reserve Component units when such assignments will provide a cost-effective replacement for Active Component forces
- Establishing habitual relationships between specific Guard or Reserve units, as appropriate and available, and individual Combatant Commands or other DoD or Service components to enable the development and sustainment of long-term relationships through employment planning and exercises²
- Establishing national or regional Reserve Component units staffed with personnel who are willing to serve on Active Duty more frequently or for longer duration than typically expected of reservists in order to facilitate their use for certain missions
- Accommodating the demands imposed by emerging needs, to include cyber defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional engagement; and HD and DSCA
- Increasing the level of integration of Active and Reserve forces into “blended units” to include ones that are predominately filled from the Active Component as well as others that are predominately filled by the Reserve Component

² The study does not specify the exact nature of the proposed habitual relationship, but leaves it to the Services to determine the specific doctrinal relationship to be employed if and when such a relationship is established. In some instances, the Service may assign a reserve force to a Combatant Command or other DoD component. In other cases, the Service could determine that allocation or apportionment is more appropriate. All such relationships would be accomplished in accordance with the parent Service’s Title-10 responsibilities and force generation process. Thus, a Service may determine that establishment of a specific habitual relationship is contrary to its obligation to provide the best force for a given mission. Finally, the Services would retain the ability to supersede any such relationships for higher priority needs, such as more significant threats to national security.

- Assigning some portion of the institutional support tasks³ that are the responsibility of the Secretaries of the Military Departments to Reserve Component units, teams, or individuals.

Each Service may choose to address its rebalancing needs differently, depending on its specific operational requirements; adjustments can be made between the relevant Active and Reserve Components or can be limited to either the Active or Reserve Component separately. Examination of a diverse set of illustrative examples strongly suggests that rebalancing efforts that involve both the Active and Reserve Components can be expected to reduce the costs of meeting the operational needs of the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders as well as the institutional support needs of the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Moreover, rebalancing can balance stress across the Total Force while sustaining the substantial readiness investment made in the Guard and Reserve over the last decade.

Providing for a Trained, Equipped, Available, and Ready Guard and Reserve

Providing for a ready Guard and Reserve best capable of meeting national defense objectives requires modification to the way in which DoD recruits, equips, trains, employs, and cares for its Reserve Component personnel. In particular, DoD should consider implementation of the following:

- Developing enlistment or terms-of-service contracts that enable employment of Reserve Component personnel who are willing to serve on Active Duty for longer or more frequent periods than current practice
- Providing the equipment and systems that will be used during operational assignments sufficiently far in advance so that units, teams, and individuals are thoroughly proficient prior to deployment
- Reviewing Total Force training structure to include joint regional state-of-the-art training facilities, advanced simulators, equipment, and appropriate training ranges in order to maintain the readiness gains of the last decade, reduce redundancy, and gain cost effectiveness
- Sustaining Guard and Reserve readiness cycles that ensure and validate that Reserve Component forces are fully capable and interoperable with their Active Component counterparts
- Developing alternative approaches to ensure medical and dental readiness of Guard and Reserve organizations, especially those who are “next to deploy”
- Developing strategic communication plans to keep Active and Reserve Component members informed of obligations and opportunities in the All-

³The Title 10 responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments include recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing and demobilizing their assigned forces.

Volunteer Force and make them, their family members, their employers, and the general public aware that we, as a nation, appreciate their service to America.

Necessary Revisions to Law, Policy, and Doctrine

Reliance on the Reserve Component as a source for operational forces will necessitate changes to law and policy, the most important of which are listed here:

- Revise Title 10, U.S. Code, §12304 to enable responsive access to, and mobilization of, the Reserve Component to support force requirements in response to the National Security Strategy to include activities such as Theater Security Cooperation, Building Partner Capacity, and training and exercises. Authority to mobilize the Reserve Component would remain with the President, but could be delegated to cognizant officials within the Department of Defense via Executive Order.⁴
- Clarify DoD's 30-day notification policy as it applies to the activation of Reserve Component units for domestic and international emergencies to ensure understanding that this notification can be waived to meet the unique demands of such contingencies.
- Finish the work now underway to establish DoD and Service policies that effectively enable a "continuum of service" that allows service members to transition easily between varying levels of participation in the military to satisfy professional, personal, and family commitments. These new or revised policies must allow seamless transition between active and reserve statuses as well as transition between reserve categories, with all obligations and benefits conveying.
- Review and, as appropriate, revise existing Reserve Component personnel authorizations and billet-validation requirements to ensure accommodation of operational criteria as well as traditional OPLAN "strategic-depth" and surge-capability criteria.
- Simplify pay, allowances, and benefits, to include reducing the number of "duty status" designations from the current set of more than thirty.
- Support the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) [USD(AT&L)]-directed development of Service-level integrated pay and personnel systems as part of the Department's overarching Enterprise-level Information Warehouse.

⁴ Any recommendation in this report to revise Title 10 regarding access to the National Guard will be shared with the Adjutants General and consulted with the Council of Governors, consistent with Executive Order 13528.

Use of the terms “operational reserve” and “strategic reserve” is no longer recommended. From a doctrinal perspective, the terms used to describe the Active and Reserve Components, the availability of forces, and the character of many of their assigned missions are applied interchangeably and inconsistently in both formal publications and professional usage, leading to confusion and miscommunication. The Cold War definitions of many of these terms are no longer valid characterizations of current needs and environments. Updating the terms and references related to the development and application of military forces and capabilities is required across DoD.

Combatant Command View

During the coordination process for this report, several Combatant Commands proposed broader interpretations regarding a number of the Review’s key findings. While neither the Review’s co-sponsors nor the Review’s Executive Committee endorsed the Combatant Command positions, they did agree that the Combatant Command views merited inclusion in the report. Accordingly, the positions recommended by the Combatant Commands are presented here and in the appropriate sections of the main report.

The Combatant Commands argued that their Unified Command Plan (UCP) mission set imposes a requirement for critical regional and functional capabilities that are Reserve Component based, either because the necessary skill set is resident in the Reserve Component or because the current operational tempo of Active Component forces precludes their use. As a result, Combatant Commanders require access, control, and funding over any assigned Reserve Component forces for mission assurance.

Toward this end, several Combatant Commands desired the following specific changes:

- (1) Authority of the Combatant Commander to order limited voluntary or involuntary mobilization of a small number of Reserve Component units or individuals to meet the Combatant Command’s UCP mission requirements or other national security objectives, to include steady state activities.
- (2) The development of rapid activation procedures for any assigned Reserve Component units or personnel to ensure that they can meet rapid response requirements for certain contingencies.
- (3) The establishment of a flexible funding mechanism that will enable the Combatant Command to fund operational support from the Reserve Component as needed rather than relying on current Service controlled appropriations.

All of the Combatant Commands desired the following additional changes:

- (4) The establishment or continuance of a Reserve Component organization structure at each Combatant Command, to include a Joint Reserve Unit and any appropriate specialized units that might be assigned to, or otherwise associated with

the Command. Doing so would facilitate the management and operational use of all Joint Reserve personnel and provide an operational chain for the allocation or assignment of reserve units to Combatant Command theaters of operation. The specific structure of the JRU would be determined by each Combatant Command upon consideration of its specific needs.

(5) The adoption of a DoD-wide policy to standardize the interpretation and provision of entitlements when Guard and Reserve are serving on orders. To ensure that current disparities are eliminated, each Service would be required to adopt this policy.

Conclusions

Prevailing in the future strategic environment will require the Guard and Reserve to serve in an operational capacity as a trained, equipped, ready, and available force. Preventing and deterring conflict will necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component, especially those that possess high-demand skill sets, well into the future. Ensuring that these forces are available when needed will require that Reserve Component use be programmed in the Department's base budget. The seamless integration of a vibrant Guard and Reserve into a broader All-Volunteer Force remains essential to achieving the nation's defense objectives.

Keeping faith with Reserve Component service members, their families, and employers is critical to achieving this aim. Over the past nine years, Guard and Reserve service members have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. Today's men and women of the Guard and Reserve volunteer knowing that they may periodically be asked to serve on active duty. These devoted Americans have demonstrated that they embrace an operational environment that allows the Department to place increased reliance on the Reserve Component to preserve the All-Volunteer Force and maintain operational and strategic capabilities.

The service members who make up the Guard and Reserve, their families and employers have demonstrated that they are an integral part of the Total Force. Guard and Reserve service members expect to be judiciously used, assigned appropriate tasks, and provided the right training and equipment to complete the mission. To meet the service members' "Quality-of-Life" expectations, we must use the Reserve Component in roles for which they are well-suited. Doing so will increase military capacity and strengthen our strategic posture.

From an overall perspective the National Guard and Reserve add considerable value to America's national defense capabilities. The Reserve Component, in its contemporary use, adds significantly to the nation's strategic depth, enables rapid pre-trained force expansion for unforeseen mission requirements, and sustains operational force

rotations. Since September 11, 2001, the Reserve Component has convincingly confirmed that it can also provide substantial operational capability – capability that effectively enhances the quality of life of DoD's Active forces by reducing stress, by abrogating the need for conscription during periods when demands on Active forces are particularly high, and by providing a means to retain the national investment in trained personnel who chose to leave Active service. Through their close community connections, the Guard and Reserve help sustain support for DoD across the country. Inherent in their role as a part-time force, the Guard and Reserve provide these capabilities at lower cost than would be the case were the nation to rely solely on full-time forces while concurrently sustaining larger force structure.